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THE COGS AND WHEELS OF REFLEXIVE LAW – BUSINESS DISCLOSURE UNDER 
THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT 
 
In response to the novel challenges posed by labour exploitation in the contemporary business context, recent years have 
witnessed an increasing adoption of reflexive law in the form of slavery disclosure, s. 54 of the UK Modern Slavery Act 
2015 (MSA) being the latest attempt in this regard. Given that the pragmatic usages and effects of reflexive law have been 
explored far less to date than its conceptual and jurisprudential implications, this article seeks to put matters right by 
critically examining the use of this regulatory mode in the context of s.54. It also aims to contribute to the broader appraisal 
of regulatory methods by comparing reflexive laws to the traditional regulatory dichotomy which has long dominated debates 
on globalised business and human rights.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Justice, they say, has a long arm. However, reality suggests that at least in the global supply chain context 
regulatory efforts to eliminate modern slavery have not been that effective. Although slavery has now 
been de jure outlawed in all countries and the term itself is only used when referring to historical events or 
pointing to specific unethical practices in underdeveloped regions, its actual practice continues in varied 
manifestations, with the multi-layered, opaque source webs of transnational commercial organisations 
serving as convenient concealing mechanisms for this misdemeanour. 
Calls for regulating the unscrupulous practice of slavery in the context of supply chains, which often have 
a transnational character, have been part of the ever-strengthening counter-hegemonic tendency in the 
age of globalisation. 1  Until recently, debates over how to control this social ill have been mainly 
dominated by a rigid dichotomy between increasing regulation and a laissez-faire system, reflecting the 
ostensibly irreconcilable impasse between human rights advocacy groups and businesses.2 In the 1990s, 
along with the blossoming of the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the global arena, a 
greater reliance on invisible hand discipline gave rise to a proliferation of non-governmental governance 
mechanisms in the form of corporate self-regulation and multi-stakeholder initiatives in the arena of 
business and human rights. However, these private ordering schemes were subsequently shown to fall 
short of achieving the desirable substantive ends in a world of profit-maximising firms – the coverage of 
human rights initiatives remained small, leaving sizeable protection gaps, with grievance mechanisms for 
victims and external accountability mechanisms either weak or non-existent.3 Equally falling on stony 
                                                          
1 Steve New, The Transparency in Supply Chains Clause of the UK Modern Slavery Act: A Response to the Consultation, (07 May, 2015), 1. 
2 E.g., David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, (1999–2000) 25 Journal of 
Corporation Law 41, 42.  
3 Infra n 60-74; John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (WW Norton & Company, New York, 
2013), xvi, 68 & 76. 
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ground were command-and-control regulatory attempts. The transnationalised spread of modern slavery 
has given rise to novel legal issues transcending nation-states’ geographical territories and their bounded 
systems of law, and the idea of imposing overarching substantive obligations on commercial organisations 
is doctrinally incompatible with existing international legal systems. In addition, attributing human rights 
duties to a commercial organisation based on its supply chains, which might be located far away from its 
home, would generate complex impacts in an array of non-legal fields, from political economics to 
international investment, from national foreign policy to private business lobbying – the list goes on. Not 
least owing to these concerns, apart from a body of NGOs there has been near-universal political 
opposition to the imposition of substantive obligations, as demonstrated by the gloomy fate of the 2003 
UN Norms.4 This leads to a need for, and an intensifying movement towards, a viable alternative to 
traditional choices of regulation.5 
Inspired by the UN’s unanimous endorsement of the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” in 
2011, which defined the nature of businesses’ responsibility to respect the human rights of all those 
affected by their operations as a social norm over and above “compliance to laws and regulations”,6 the past 
few years have witnessed a regulatory shift towards the reflexive paradigm, beyond the conventional 
selection between the enabling mode of governance and command-and-control laws. Shorthand for 
“regulated autonomy”, reflexive law as an evolutionary conception of law suggests a mode of legal 
intervention (often procedural) to underpin and encourage various social subsystems’ self-reflection and 
autonomous adjustment.7 In combating modern slavery, this reflexive law approach has been typified by a 
mandated social reporting form, geared towards fostering business self-regulation and wide participation 
of private actors affected by this social ill, a prominent example being s.54 of the Modern Slavery Act 
(MSA) 2015, recently introduced in the United Kingdom.  
To be sure, the MSA as a whole is not reflexive in nature – it mainly concerns laying bare the 
accommodating nature of the offence of “modern slavery” and codifying criminal offences currently 
dispersed in UK domestic legislations. However, after carefully consulting all affected members, the 
lawmakers decided to insert the novel provision of s.54 into the Act, requiring commercial organisations 
to disclose in their annual slavery statement whether they have made efforts to ensure that slavery and 
human trafficking are not taking place in their global supply chains, and if so, requiring a statement of the 
detailed steps taken. 8  This mandate has reflexive resonances in several aspects, demonstrated in its 
conformation to the global regulatory currents, its reliance on internal business decision-making in 
tackling modern slavery, and its promotion of multi-stakeholder engagement by eliminating information 
asymmetry. In principle this provision would apply to all types of commercial organisations that satisfy 
                                                          
4 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). See Ruggie, ibid. for a detailed discussion of the defeat of the 2003 Norms. 
5 Hess, n 2, 42. 
6 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, (New York, 2011), Principle 11 Commentary. 
7 See infra notes 80 -94 for further discussions on the connotation of reflexive law. 
8 S.54 (4) of the MSA. 
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the prescribed threshold of £36 million annual turnover and have sufficient territorial connection to the 
UK,9  although in implementation the impact would particularly be felt where the activities concern 
transnational corporations (TNCs) with operations outside the UK jurisdiction, who are said to be “the 
most powerful agent for the internationalisation of human society”.10 
Although this provision focuses on enhancing transparency in supply chains, its broad-spectrum 
relevance to the impact and responsibility of commercial organisations to respect human rights, amid 
contentious debates and deep divisions surrounding the interests and preferences of major stakeholder 
players, is one manifestation of a much broader reappraisal of the reflexive paradigm of laws amid 
globalisation that this article seeks to address. Furthermore, since Teubner’s original intellectual account 
of reflexive law,11 doctrinal and conceptual discussions of this regulatory approach have already generated 
much jurisprudence literature.12 However, it seems that decades of thought have just begun to bring to 
life a wider pragmatic usage of this legal paradigm in combating modern slavery, providing compelling 
reasons for thinking again about its practical effectiveness. This paper also seeks to do some justice in this 
regard, by revisiting and appraising the intrinsic worth and defects of s. 54 as a functional response to 
modern slavery in the transnational supply chain context.  
Part I outlines why there is a vital and compelling need for more business responsibility in tackling 
modern slavery in the global supply chain context. Following an examination of the inadequacies of the 
conventional regulatory means in Part II, Part III examines the raison d’être of mandatory business 
disclosure in the current climate of business and human rights. After a comparison with conventional 
command-and-control laws and private governance mechanisms, Parts IV and V evaluate the intrinsic 
worth of this reflexive mode of regulation in detail, as well as the doctrinal and potential functional limits 
as shown in s. 54. The last section concludes the article. While this lawmaking attempt constitutes a good 
initial move in term of raising businesses’ and people’s awareness of the severity of modern slavery, it 
encounters significant limits that make it unlikely to become fully purposive, attributable to both the 
designation defects of s. 54 and ingrained features of reflexive law, most prominently, a substantively 
discretionary system inclined to privileged social and economic interests, and the difficulty of framing the 
formal and institutional architecture that could effectively steer complex and fragmented societal forces. 
MODERN SLAVERY AND BUSINESS RESPONSIBILITY 
 
                                                          
9 The Modern Slavery Act (Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015, No. 1833, Regulation 2. 
10 Comments from Aurelio Peccei, a Director of Fiat during the 1970s and organiser of the Club of Rome, quoted by Fleur Johns, 
The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporations, (1993-1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 893. 
11 Gunther Teubner, “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law”, (1983) 17(2) Law & Society Review 239. 
12 E.g. William E. Scheuerman, Reflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalisation, (2001) 9(1) The Journal of Political Philosophy 81; 
Hess, n 2; Harry W Arthurs, Corporate Self-Regulation: Political Economy, State Regulation and Reflexive Labour Law, in 
Cynthia Estlund & Brian Bercusson (eds.), Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalisation (Oxford, Hart, 2008), 19-37.  
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Modern Slavery 
 
As an undesirable attribute of human activities and an enduring feature of human society, slavery has 
existed since time immemorial and continues to feature prominently in discussions and practices in the 
modern world. While the conventional form of slavery, characterised by the exercise of powers relevant 
to the ownership over a person,13 is now a “legal impossibility” in the modern world,14 the de jure abolition of 
formal slavery relations has not brought to an end their persistence in reality. Along with the burgeoning 
of international business and investment in the contemporary context, the practical forms of this long-
lasting social ill have only transformed to become more concealed and dynamic – for instance, servitude, 
i.e. the obligation to provide services imposed by coercion, forced or compulsory labour covering work 
exacted from any person who has not voluntarily offered to do it, and human trafficking, namely the 
arrangement or facilitation of the travel of other people with a view to exploiting them when they reach 
their destination.15 
Perplexed by modern slavery’s diverse manifestations, the international legal regime has been plagued by 
loose usage over the past decades, frequently conflating “slavery-like practices” with “slavery” or “practices 
similar to slavery”.16 As a catch-all term, modern slavery broadly includes all activities involving “someone 
obtaining or holding another person in compelled service”.17 As summarised by Antislavery International, human 
exploitation characterised by only one of the following features is classed as modern slavery: (1) forced to 
work through either mental or physical threat; (2) owned or controlled by an employer, usually through 
mental or physical abuse or the threat of abuse; (3) dehumanised, treated as a commodity or bought and 
sold as property; (4) physically constrained or has restrictions placed on his/her freedom of movement.18 
Adopted on 26 March, 2015, the UK MSA also attempts to emphasise the concealed nature and various 
guises of this unscrupulous behaviour by adopting the terminology of modern slavery. Existing criminal 
offences scattered across different domestic legislations have been consolidated in this legislative 
instrument, including various forms of enslavement, forced labour or compulsory labour, servitude and 
                                                          
13 A widely-acknowledged definition of conventional forms of slavery was offered by the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave 
Trade and Slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised”. Art. 
1, Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (1926). 
14 The Queen v Tang [2008] HCA 39, para 20, per Gleeson CJ. 
15 S. 1 of the MSA directly employs the offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour prescribed in Article 4 of 
the European Human Rights Convention, and construal is to be given in accordance with the Convention, too. Although the 
wording of Art. 4 of the Convention does not explicitly cover trafficking, in case judgements the European Court of Human 
Rights ruled that human trafficking fell within the application scope of Art. 4. See Siliadin v France [2005] ECHR 545, 73316/01; 
Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia [2010] ECHR 22, 25965/04 for further details on these definitions. Also Home Office, Modern Slavery 
and Supply Chains Consultation, (2015), 7. 
16 Jean Allain, The Legal Definition of Slavery into the Twenty-First Century, in Jean Allain (ed.), The Legal Understanding of Slavery 
(OUP, 2012), 199, 215. 
17  US Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, What is Modern Slavery? available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/what/index.htm. 
18 http://www.antislavery.org/english/slavery_today/what_is_modern_slavery.aspx; Andrew Crane, Modern Slavery as A 
Management Practice (2013) 38(1) Academy of Management Review 49, 59. 
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human trafficking. Presumably efforts to combat all these kinds of human exploitation fall within the 
range of conduct that s. 54 requires commercial organisations to disclose, although in practice the fact 
that slavery and forced labour generally do not come packaged in plain form and are often intertwined 
with other human rights abuses would render its implementation difficult.19 
 
Modern Slavery in Global Supply Chains 
 
Throughout history, what is regarded as slavery has adapted fluidly to the changing world. With the effect 
of globalisation spreading to almost every corner of the world, modern slavery itself has also been 
adapting alongside this trend – a high incidence of it has been witnessed scattered across the cross-border 
purviews of commercial organisations. Going global for most businesses implicates the adoption of 
hierarchical cross-border operating models, and network-based sourcing arrangements spread across the 
globe.20 While these organisational forms operate in a cost-effective and near-seamless manner across a 
global range, their modern business features, including diversified socio-economic hosts and a large 
number of participating units, increase the intricacy of their governance as well as their value chains, 
thereby also increasing the difficulty of detecting and fighting slavery wrongs, quite apart from acts of 
malfeasance or negligence by entrepreneurs or business officials.21 
Although the hidden nature of modern slavery makes it difficult to get accurate data, existing research in 
the field reveals a startling picture. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), there are 
an estimated 20.9 million forced and compulsory labour victims worldwide, and their stolen labour 
generates US$ 150.2 billion per year in illegal profits.22 The geographical spread of the problem is also 
extensive – in effect no country remains unscarred by modern slavery,23 and the United Kingdom is no 
exception: as of 2009, it was estimated that there were more than 5,000 trafficking victims there.24 The 
number rose sharply to an estimate of between 10,000 and 13,000 in 2013, and the National Crime 
Agency admitted that this statistical coverage is “only partial”.25 It is further noted that the complex and 
often opaque webs that constitute modern supply chains have increased the likelihood of businesses 
being complicit in impairing human rights by providing below-subsistence compensation, unhealthy 
working conditions and harmful environmental pollution, with slavery-related offences being one of the 
                                                          
19 Ruggie, n 3, 19–22. 
20 John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda (2007) 101(4) AJIL 819, 823. 
21 Sophia Eckert, The Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act (2013) 12 Journal of International Business & Law 383, 
387. 
22 International Labour Office, Profits and Poverty: The Economies of Forced Labour (Geneva, 2014), 7 & 13. 
23 International Labour Office, n 22, 7 & 13. 
24 Home Affairs Committee, The Trade in Human Beings: Human Trafficking in the UK, 6 May 2009, HC23-I 2008-09, para 28.  
25 Bernard Silverman, Modern Slavery: An Application of Multiple Systems Estimation (27 Nov, 2014), 1. 
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most egregious issues.26 According to an investigation by the US Department of Labour, in 2012 about 
122 goods from 72 countries were tainted by forced or child labour, ranging from everyday items like 
coffee, cotton and shoes to more complex products such as minerals.27 90% of forced labour victims are 
currently exploited in private business sectors, with abusive sweatshops that feed into global supply 
chains one of the major forms of this.28 
“With power should come responsibility.” 29  With the increasing probability of commercial organisations 
becoming involved in running afoul of prevailing social norms, business and human rights has become an 
increasingly prominent theme on the international agenda. The idea that a commercial organisation's 
obligations include a responsibility to combat modern slavery connected with its operations flows from 
multiple aspects. A vigorous normative account derives from the realist perspective, arguing that a body 
corporate is in legal terms an independent entity with its own rights and assets, separate from the sum of 
the individuals working for it.30 As such, it is rational to consider its interests and responsibilities on an 
independent basis. The economic might and global reach of some multinational businesses compared 
with competitors and even states has also led to a perception that they have a peculiar ability to have an 
impact on the human rights of workers and community members affected by their operations and supply 
chain networks.31 Empirical studies have also asserted the force of business involvement in anti-slavery 
efforts, postulating a positive link between large enterprises’ supply chain interventions and moderating 
slavery practices, mainly achieved via altering existing distribution methods and reducing the side-effects 
of high labour intensity by the introduction of new techniques.32 
CONVENTIONAL DICHOTOMY OF REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE 
 
Even if morally the conventional character of businesses’ arm’s length relationships with human rights 
issues is no longer sustainable, legally cross-border business activities pose significant conceptual and 
pragmatic challenges to the existing rules of the game. Doctrinal views on the proper ways for 
commercial organisations to undertake responsibility to eradicate modern slavery have long been 
paralysed by the rigid distinction between binding regulations and non-governmental governance 
mechanisms, with debates and practices asserting the deficits of both, as will be examined below. 
 
                                                          
26 Denis G. Arnold, Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights, (2010) 20(3) Business Ethics 
Quarterly 371. 
27 US Department of Labour, List of Goods Produced by Child Labour or Forced Labour (30 Sep, 2013). 
28 Charlie Fanning, The International Labour Organisation Adopts New Standards to Eradicate Forced Labour (Dec 6, 2014).  
29  David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, (2003) 97 AJIL 901. 
30 “(A company is) a group-person, and its will is a group-will.” WM Geldart, “Legal Personality” (1911) LQR 27 90, 93.  
31 David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 
(2003-04) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931, 955. 
32 Crane, n 18, 55. 
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Difficulties with Command-and-Control Regulation 
 
Given the high incidence and severity of modern slavery in the global supply chains context, on purely 
logical grounds one might expect that substantive duties on commercial organisations, which are generally 
punitive and adversarial, would feature more strongly. Considering transnational businesses’ deep pockets 
and their inability to rely on sovereign immunity, there has indeed been a strong move in the literature to 
make them genuine human rights dutyholders, and to develop overarching binding standards under which 
they could be held accountable for slavery and human trafficking abuses occurring in their global supply 
chains.33 However, logic alone does not suffice in making law. In the legal context, substantive duties 
dealing with the time-space compression generated by globalisation would lead to conceptual and 
pragmatic incompatibilities with the existing rules of the game, both domestic and international, which 
cannot be changed in the short term, if at all. 
 
State Action  
 
Slavery has no frontiers, but state-centred legal systems do. To begin with, if one body corporate within a 
multinational group engages in wrongdoing, the domestic nature of corporate laws and the separate legal 
personality orthodoxy would effectively shield other group members from being sued or liable,34 not to 
mention upstream suppliers or downstream consumers in global supply chains. Although English courts 
recently made a novel attempt in Chandler v Cape35 to impose on a parent company responsibility for the 
health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees, the decision itself has been doctrinally challenged in 
various aspects36 and only two years later in Thompsen v the Renwick Group Plc37 the Court of Appeal 
rejected the claim that the parent holding company owed a direct duty of care to the subsidiary’s 
employees, indicating that the pragmatic dynamics of business groups often render the requirements set 
out in Chandler v Cape difficult to satisfy.  
Even if one accepts without reservation the doctrinal force of the assumption of responsibility principle 
and its applicability in the group company context, there remains the important question of 
                                                          
33 E.g. Peter T. Muchlinski, Human Rights and Multinationals, Is there a Problem? (2001) 77(1) International Affairs 31; Steven R. 
Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility (2001) 111(3) The Yale Law Journal 443; Jason Levy, 
Slavery Disclosure Laws: For Financial Reparations or For “Telling the Truth?” (2009) Columbia Business Law Review 468; Denis G. 
Arnold, Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights, (2010) 20(3) Business Ethics Quarterly 371–399, 
380. 
34 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433. Also Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, showing the reluctance of English 
courts to acknowledge “piercing the corporate veil” as a general doctrine of law. 
35 [2012] EWCA Civ 525. 
36 E.g. Martin Petrin, Assumption of Responsibility in Corporate Groups: Chandler v Cape plc, (2013) 76(3) MLR 603, 603-619. 
37 [2014] EWCA Civ 635, paras 31-39, per Tomlinson LJ. 
8 
 
extraterritorial jurisdiction when it comes to tackling modern slavery in global supply chains.38 State-based 
legal systems struggle to adjust to the expanding reach of transnational businesses. Up to now the notion 
of extraterritorial legislation by which State A applies its law to, and accepts jurisdiction over, activities by 
third parties in State B, remains alien to the majority of the civil law body.39 While an exception to 
territorial-based state jurisdiction exists in the common law world – the principle of forum non conveniens –
this has been performing as a shield rather than a sword in the pursuit of business human rights liability: 
while in principle local courts can deploy this doctrine and, if appropriate, hold an overseas commercial 
organisation liable for human right abuses outside its national territory, in practice large business 
defendants have on a number of occasions successfully convinced the courts to dismiss on forum non 
conveniens grounds, dodging liability for alleged misdemeanours abroad.40 Existing research also shows that 
cases invoking this doctrine against TNCs only seek to establish the direct negligence of the parent 
company, rather than acknowledging its responsibility for the wrongs of its overseas subsidiaries, let alone 
third parties along its global supply chains.41 
 
Direct International Law Application 
 
As most businesses engaged in cross-border activities have virtually become entities cut off from national 
allegiances, a doctrinal question arises as to whether international laws may be directly applicable to these 
enterprises, detached from diverse and possibly parochial state-based laws. As yet this has not been the 
case; while international law recognises individuals and states as possible perpetrators of certain human 
rights abuses, it does not accept private business defendants.42 While many commercial organisations 
operate on an international stage, they are legally defined as nationals of individual states rather than as 
independent entities at the same level as states, with no capacity to be directly bound by international legal 
duties. Likewise, commercial organisations are explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, which is confined to individuals only.43 As remarked by Judge Simma, 
business liability under international law is perhaps one of the “areas where international law has not yet come to 
regulate, or indeed, will never come to regulate”.44 
                                                          
38 Chandler v Cape [2012] EWCA Civ 525 and Thompson v the Renwick Group Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 635 both concerned UK-based 
companies only and did not raise the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
39 Kinley & Tadaki, n 31, 937. 
40 This has happened in a number of common law jurisdictions. See e.g., Connelly v RTZ Corp. [1998] AC 854; Aldana Del Monte 
Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009); Mastafa c. Australian Wheat Bd. Ltd. No. 07 CIV. 7955 (GEL), 2008 WL 
4378443 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008). 
41 Kinley & Tadaki, n 31, 939. 
42 Kiobel et al v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013); Uta Kohl, Corporate Human Rights Accountability: The 
Objections of Western Governments to the Alien Tort Statute, (2014) 63(3) ICLQ 665, 670. 
43 Art. 25(1), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (as corrected by the process-verbaux of 10 November 1998 and 
12 July 1999).  
44 Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo (ICJ, Declaration by 
Judge Simma), 22 July 2010, para 9; quoted in Kohl, n 42, 690. 
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Application of International Laws through Domestic Courts 
 
Some might suggest that enslavement and slavery-like practices are generally regarded as among the most 
egregious crimes, thereby falling into the realm of customary universal jurisdiction,45 according to which 
any state is under an obligation to “extradite or prosecute”, regardless of whether that state is otherwise 
connected with the offender or the offence.46  However, this is problematical. First, the universality 
principle itself is doctrinally disputable. Opponents challenge this idea as a breach of the fundamental 
concept of international law, which is that all states are equal in sovereignty as affirmed by the United 
Nations Charter.47 In legal practice, the legacy of state dominion is still alive and well in many jurisdictions. 
As Justice Story remarked: “No nation has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum of the whole world…”48 The 
“good motives on human rights” would not automatically justify uncalled-for intervention from any national 
government or court in another states’ jurisdiction, as “basic international law requirements, including those related 
to the limits on national jurisdiction” should not be discarded lightly.49 
Even taking for granted the doctrinal force of universal jurisdiction, it still remains debatable whether this 
is an obligation or merely an entitlement.50 Without a definitive answer to this critical question, in practice 
the enforcement of customary international law through domestic courts inevitably invokes significant 
extraterritorial concerns, as addressed above. It is also irrational to expect nations with limited finances to 
pursue crimes in far-away places, bearing all the logistic, financial and political consequences entailed 
therein. 51  Given these concerns, it is not surprising that commercial organisations, especially those 
engaged in cross-border activities, are regarded as operating “in a legal vacuum” with respect to human 
rights exploitation, including slavery and human trafficking abuses.52 Though some existing international 
conventions and initiatives developed by inter-governmental organisations recognise the human rights 
responsibilities of businesses, for instance, the UN Global Social Compact and the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, they depend on states as intermediaries of enforcement and do not support 
direct human rights claims against commercial organisations,53 leaving intact the different capacities and 
roles played by states and businesses in human rights protection. 
 
                                                          
45 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147, March, 21, 2006.  
46 Kohl, n 42, 674. 
47 Art. 2(1), Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
48 United States v The LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (No. 15,551) (CC. Mass. 1822). 
49 Esther Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, (February, 2012),9. 
50 Ilias Banekas & Efthymios Papstavridis, International Law, (OUP 2013), 81. 
51 Jones v Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya [2006] UKHL 26, para 27, per Lord Bingham. 
52 Kinley & Tadaki, n 31, 934. 
53 Esther Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Brief of the Governments, n 49, 22. 
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From Regulation to Governance: Soft Law Mechanisms 
 
Practices and Theories 
 
As the dynamics of globalised business operations pose profound challenges to conventional modes of 
regulation, a range of soft law alternatives have developed to fill the regulatory gap in the past few 
decades, comprising both self-regulation by commercial organisations who have created their own codes 
of conduct and evaluation regimes, and various forms of non-governmental regulation, including: (1) 
standards, policies and other initiatives established by group companies, NGOs and other institutions – 
for instance, the non-binding codes developed by the Fair Labour Association and the Worldwide 
Responsible Apparel Production; (2) certification schemes advocating businesses’ voluntary adherence to 
recommended operational standards and procedures, the Social Accountability 8000 certification scheme 
being a typical example; and (3) other loose forms of initiatives, such as training manuals, workshops, and 
human rights impact assessments. 54  Marking an increasing shift of preference from regulation to 
governance, these regulatory alternatives are also broadly labelled as mechanisms of private governance as 
they primarily operate externally from the traditional state-centric institutions and instruments.55 
In parallel with the blossoming of these institutionally determined, non-state systems of labour 
governance, scholars have been carving theoretical lenses to conceptualise and legitimate the trajectories 
of private ordering experimentation. Much of the governance literature, against a backdrop of weak 
public regulatory capacity, argues for the legitimacy and effectiveness of private authority in responding to 
social complexities and replacing conventional laws.56 As suggested by Keohane and Nye, “Governance need 
not necessarily be conducted exclusively by governments and the international organisations to which they delegate authority. 
Private firms, associations of firms, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and associations of NGOs all engage in it … 
to create governance, sometimes without governmental authority.”57 A public relations concern has been frequently 
raised by proponents of private ordering, suggesting the capacity of various stakeholders to press for 
business behaviour changes. As jointly put in a report by the Prince of Wales Business Leaders’ Forum 
and Amnesty International, “While a company is not legally obliged … to comply with [human rights] standards, those 
companies who have violated them have found, to their cost, that society at large will condemn them.”58 The legitimacy of 
private governance modes, constituting individual corporations’ policies, management tools and the 
dissemination of best practices, has also been advocated by the law and economics school by reference to 
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“efficiency” and “market demands”,59 suggesting that they would narrow the regulatory gaps between business 
and human rights in the ways best suitable to businesses’ own agendas and industrial circumstances.  
 
Inadequacies of Non-Governmental Governance  
 
While the shift from “government to governance”60 has led to a heterarchy of governance models, practice has 
indicated that these private ordering systems, including both company-based self-regulation and other 
governance alternatives, fell short of achieving the desirable regulatory ends. For many commercial 
organisations, eliminating adverse human rights impacts supposedly ran counter to their primary goal of 
maximising investor returns,61 and human rights-related agendas would only be included in their strategic 
vision to the extent that they were considered necessary for understanding the prospects of the business, 
subject to the directors’ business judgement. Hence, in practice commercial organisations within self-
regulatory regimes mainly conducted strategic disclosure to demonstrate the legitimacy of their business, 
rather than to increase the transparency of their social performance.62 This was shown by businesses’ 
inclination to only disclose social and environmental information in the face of severe externalities that 
threatened their legitimacy.63 Even then the information tended to be very one-sided, reflecting only the 
positive aspects of corporate performance.64 
Other private governance mechanisms have also proved not as effective in eliminating human rights 
abuses in supply chains as anticipated. A central tenet underpinning private ordering is the belief that 
various social actors affected by the regulated activity ought to and could take the law into their own 
hands to reach consensus about the way forward. As such, private governance proponents generally “do 
not take strong normative or critical stands” on the diminution of public authorities and formal regulation.65 
However, to a large extent this idealises the forces of cohesion in a society that is “actually deeply complex 
and fragmented”,66 implicitly assuming a far greater degree of multi-stakeholder representation than private 
governance actually involves. An undesirable yet often foreseeable result is the manifestation of power 
asymmetries between business giants, non-governmental inspectors, and workers. Research has also 
proved the existence of such power asymmetry in private governance practices, where business and 
consumer preferences have become mainstream concerns, while workers’ claims are merely dependent or 
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even marginal.67 In addition, many of these initiatives employ businesses’ internal or connected third-
party evaluation mechanisms to monitor and assess compliance, which inevitably heightens the 
vulnerability of these private governance schemes to manipulation by businesses.68 While there exist a few 
schemes using independent evaluation and monitoring mechanisms, absent the formal authority of the 
state and legal institutions, they have been facing immense challenges in actual implementation and the 
coverage of their schemes thus far has been limited. To take the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) as an 
example, over the past fourteen years it conducted a total of 112 inspections on factories producing 
apparel and other products for the US and Canada market,69 and performed labour standards verification 
for one factory, yet the number of apparel factories producing for the US markets alone was estimated at 
above 100,000.70 
The inadequacy of private governance mechanisms in responding to social complexities is further 
manifest by their institutional diversities. With varied institutional sources of norm creation and distinct 
procedural devices for implementation, these governance mechanisms have thus far come in unsystematic 
forms, with wide divergence in their substance, scope, participation, and implementation.71 Indeed, it was 
found that in the past few decades private governance initiatives have never developed “at an equal pace nor 
have they developed consistently,”72 progressing unevenly across and within countries and industry sectors. In 
relation to the subject of labour’s human rights in business contexts, the force of these institutionally 
determined, non-state systems is even weaker. Research has revealed that thus far only a small number of 
the socially responsible policies of large businesses contain items concerning human rights protection, let 
alone the more concealed subjects of slavery and human trafficking.73 Investors have already expressed a 
high level of dissatisfaction with the current sustainability-related information provided by businesses, 
particularly the lack of attention to the protection of workers’ human rights as part of the business 
environment.74 
 
In view of the inadequacies of soft law mechanisms, the earlier draft of the Modern Slavery Bill 
(introduced into the House of Commons on 10 June 2014), which did not touch the topic of modern 
                                                          
67 For instance, although the International Financial Corporation (IFC) has made observance of the ILO Core Labour Standards 
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slavery in supply chains for fear of placing “additional burdens (on businesses)”,75 met with severe criticism 
from the public, scholars and even various Government bodies for its deliberate neglect of the subject.76 
The Evidence Review Panel, acknowledging the systematic limits of voluntary initiatives underpinning 
private governance, concluded emphatically that non-mandatory initiatives were no longer adequate to 
“represent an effective enough first step (in combating modern slavery)”.77 Likewise, the Joint Committee on the Bill 
reached a similar conclusion on the effect of voluntary codes in the UK.78 While private ordering could 
play a complementary and reinforcing role, it could not replace public regulatory systems in the business 
and human rights domain. 79  The elements of any pragmatic solution have thus to draw upon the 
indispensable power and active engagement not only of market actors, but also of public authorities. 
 
THE REFLEXIVE LEGAL PARADIGM AND SOCIAL REPORTING 
 
The Connotation of Reflexive Law 
 
Initially conceived in the 1970s as part of the legal evolutionary efforts to resolve the difficulty of 
conventional regulatory means in handling growing societal complexities, accounts of reflexive law have 
since also evolved to address the myriad challenges generated by globalisation and businesses’ 
emancipation from jurisdictional confinements.80 Another term for “regulated autonomy”, reflexive law seeks 
to apply coercion in a limited way so as to develop self-corrective structures sensitive to various 
externalities via norms of organisation and procedures, while acknowledging bounded political and 
economic powers, cultural values, social norms and ways of being.81 In comparison to the regulatory 
option of substantive obligations, reflexive law offers a less direct form of legal intervention, encouraging 
internal critical reflection within social spheres and regulating their self-regulating processes. Meanwhile, it 
seeks to provide a level playing field for all businesses, and diminish the protection gaps endemic to non-
governmental governance. 
In conjunction with the blossoming of legal pluralism,82 the connotation of reflexive law closely connects 
to a body of regulatory and social science scholarship, and its provenance is not without contestation. At 
a macro level, the term “reflexive law” has been used interchangeably with “responsive law”, broadly 
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encapsulating a socially responsive, contextualised and ultimately learning model of legal intervention.83 
Some scholars also see the conceptual peripheries between reflexive law and private governance as 
blurred, drawing on their shared ideal of the self-referentiality of regulatory systems and their common 
aim of reconceptualising law to account for increasing social plurality.84 
In a strict sense, however, reflexive law juxtaposes itself with these similar and related accounts. The ideal 
of responsive law emphasises autonomous internal legal growth, whilst paying considerably less attention 
to external socio-legal covariation.85 A key element of responsive law is the “politicisation of law”, creating 
public-interest-oriented values and substantive principles of law through political deliberation, and leave 
detailed solutions for regulated institutions to craft, subject to the state’s scrutiny and punishment.86 As 
noted by Nonet and Selznick, “Responsive law is no maker of miracles in the realm of justice. Its achievements depend 
on the will and resources of the political community.”87 In comparison, reflexive law emphasises social plurality 
more than responsive law does, and sees the main role of law as to stimulate and steer self-regulation by 
social institutions and systems, whilst retreating from “taking full responsibility for substantive outcomes”.88 In 
terms of substantive law’s limitations in expressing common values in a plural world, it seeks to set out 
more loosely defined regulatory parameters within which social institutions can have a substantial zone of 
freedom to engage in self-regulation. Proceduralisation is the primary regulatory method for this, 
including “duties of disclosure, audit, justification, consultation, and organisation of internal control processes.”89 
The conceptual controversy between reflexive law and private governance, on the other hand, largely 
derives from the different shades of meaning afforded to “law”. Scholars who approximate these two 
concepts interpret law as a comprehensive system of communicative actions, expanding its provenance to 
“a property of self-correction”.90 Reflexive law, in its narrow sense, is nonetheless constructed on the basis of 
“a strict definition of law”, namely a symbolic system of legal rules stemming from court decisions, doctrinal 
inventions, and legislative acts. 91  This has crucial implications for their diverse perceptions of legal 
intervention. Instead of dismissing rule-oriented formalism overwhelmingly as some private governance 
proponents do,92 it is seen through the lens of strict reflexive law as “the doctrinal expression of legal self-
referentiality”,93 a helpful internal structure for the autopoietic organisation of the law. The major weakness 
of legal formalism lies in its difficulty in communicating with other autopoietic social subsystems that 
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constitute the law’s external environment; reflexive scholarship believes this could be addressed through 
procedural stimulation of internal self-regulating processes in social systems. As noted by Teubner, 
reflexive law “does not support the hopes of a naive delegalisation movement… On the contrary, it is to be expected that, 
with the increasing autonomy of social subsystems, the trend of increasing legalisation will continue.”94 
The recent lawmaking attempt in the UK in form of s. 54 of the MSA, namely state-dictated disclosure 
with the aim of encouraging internal decision-making and behaviour changes in commercial organisations, 
thereby falls into the realm of this strictly-defined reflexive law rather than responsive law and private 
governance. In the field of business and modern slavery, in recent years there has been a spectacular 
increase of disclosure laws in step with this strict reflexive law mode, requiring commercial organisations 
to disclose their proactive anti-slavery efforts in the supply chain context.  
 
Social Reporting as a Reflexive Approach 
 
The need for more disclosure on modern slavery is evident. As suggested by Karen Bradley, the Minister 
for Modern Slavery and Organised Crime, “modern slavery is a largely hidden crime. To tackle it effectively, we need 
to understand the scale and nature of the problem better.”95 Indeed, if a commercial organisation today is accused 
of slavery, the typical response is to deny it, rather than justifying it as a matter of cultural choice.96 The 
various guises of modern slavery further facilitate its intrusion into almost every aspect of life, becoming 
entangled with political and cultural contexts and making it even more difficult for problems to be 
detected and remedied. Research has disclosed that while a poorly regulated environment is likely to result 
in high occurrences of slavery, incidences are also found in well-governed industrialised countries, largely 
owing to a deficit in stakeholders’ attention to slavery.97 Justice Brandeis’ famous line “Sunshine is the best of 
disinfectants”98 has thereby aptly come to epitomise the normative insight and functions of mandatory 
disclosure in today’s world. By opening their affairs and placing them under market and public scrutiny, it 
is more difficult for a commercial organisation to deny its own guilt or overlook its own idleness, thereby 
obliquely facilitating the enhancement of human rights protection at the institutional level. 
 
Reflections on Global Legal Currents  
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Mandatory social disclosure laws are not limited to dealing with informational asymmetries as regards 
modern slavery. This type of law is “reflexive” primarily in that it encourages commercial organisations to 
constantly re-examine and improve their practices owing to the effect of social externalities.99 It also 
makes easier participation by those affected by business activities, thereby creating further pressure in 
favour of responsible business decision-making. In addition, as globalisation has raised the issue of the 
transnationalisation of good governance, individual state lawmaking today is also required to take into 
account and reflect the broad vision of the businesses’ global action plan, if any.100 
Contemporary reflections on global currents in favour of tackling modern slavery and increasing 
corporate transparency have been influential in shaping the UK’s modern slavery legislation. This type of 
reflexive reporting mandate first surfaced in the US, with the California Transparency in Supply Chains 
Act 2010 (CTSCA). Enacted in January 2012, this requires that retailers and manufacturers doing business 
in California with annual worldwide gross receipts of $100 million or more must disclose their efforts to 
eradicate slavery and human trafficking along their global supply chain for tangible goods offered for 
sale. 101  Alongside this state legislative move, a similar bill – H.R. 2759 Business Transparency on 
Trafficking and Slavery Act – was also introduced at the federal level, requiring publicly listed companies 
to include similar information in their annual reports filed with the SEC.  
Another major move towards transparency in supply chains in the international arena came from the EU. 
Social disclosure has dominated the EU’s latest policy tone concerning business and human rights, 
reflected in the Directive on non-financial disclosure, the revised Directive on public procurement, as well 
as the proposed “responsible sourcing of minerals” policy development.102 In particular, the Non-Financial 
Reporting Directive adopted in 2014 requires eligible commercial organisations to produce a consolidated 
non-financial statement containing information relevant to respect for human rights, and, where relevant 
and proportionate, having regard to its supply and subcontracting chains.103 This requires more than the 
current UK Companies’ Act, obliging corporations to provide human rights information concerning not 
just their own operations but also those in “business relationships” with them, including subcontracting and 
supply chains.104 
Appreciating the rapid development of these disclosure requirements concerning modern slavery, a tide 
of calls for similar legislation arose in the UK along, suggesting that businesses over a certain size should 
disclose information about their efforts to eradicate slavery and trafficking from their supply chains. This 
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began with the Centre for Social Justice report entitled “It Happens Here”, in which legislation modelled on 
the California Act was called for.105 This was joined by the Joint Committee’s report on the draft Bill 
published in April 2014, in which the formulation and practical impact of California’s 2010 legislation was 
discussed in detail as a potential model of legislation.106 Throughout the parliamentary debating process, 
in both Houses the California Act has “often been cited as a sort of reference point or a benchmark.”107 In such 
circumstances, creating a clause to legislate in favour of transparency in supply chains seemed like a stone 
that could hit several birds at one time: it would reflect legislative developments from the EU and the 
international arena, and it would effectively respond to mounting domestic calls to strengthen the 
legislative framework concerning commercial organisations and modern slavery. Most importantly, most 
businesses welcomed the legislative proposal – in direct consultations, they acknowledged that legal 
mandates on business disclosure were non-burdensome compared to concrete duties in relation to human 
rights, and they would promote fair competition by requiring all businesses of a similar size to disclose.108 
Social pressures to conform to the prevailing norms of disclosure, added to the close economic and 
political connections between the UK and the US and the EU, made the conception of transparency in 
supply chains an attractive one. In the final consultation paper on the transparency in supply chains clause 
the Government explicitly acknowledged that s.54 of the MSA was being introduced along with rising 
global expectations of business with regard to human rights, citing both the California Act and the EU 
Directive.109 
 
MERITS OF REFLEXIVE LAW  
 
As well as a timely reflection of the global currents of regulatory development, the reflexive nature of s. 
54 sets it in contrast to both soft and substantive laws, and, in a chain of causation, exposes some of the 
merits and limitations of this regulatory mode. The following two sections contribute in this regard, by 
comparing and contrasting reflexive law with the other two regulatory choices. 
 
Mandatory Disclosure vs. Substantive Obligations 
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Confronting the Challenges Posed by Globalisation 
 
One prominent feature of reflexive law in comparison with substantive laws is its adjustability to the 
complexities of globalisation. Needless to say, regulating slavery in a global supply chain context involves 
the reconciliation of various strategies and instruments in different countries to pursue the consensual 
goal. True, slavery is condemned by multiple international instruments, and norms prohibiting slavery are 
often seen as jus cogens,110 protecting human beings’ basic rights to liberty, inherent dignity and physical 
integrity. However, this moral absolutism functions at the level of cognisance rather than practice, and 
thus conceals the pragmatic risk of implementation inconsistency among nations that are often riddled 
with cultural differences and linguistic contrasts. Issues that require clarification in imposing and 
enforcing anti-slavery legislation, such as how far modern slavery may encompass unacceptable working 
treatment, servile conditions of living, or discrimination, are found to be open to various forms of 
interpretation in different host states, underlying the diversity of national cultures and labour 
entitlements. 111  For instance, the right of gender equality may have been universally recognised in 
principle, but the extent to which it is implemented varies enormously in different host environments.112 
This generates diverse legal interpretations of the concept of involuntary domestic servitude, a widely-
regarded form of modern slavery. While accusations from realists that any detailed ex ante specification of 
rights/duties is an inherently fruitless exercise might be a little overstated,113 they do indicate the difficulty 
faced by the state-centric command-and-control paradigm in confronting the challenges posed by 
globalisation. 
Reflexive law meshes better with such a pluralistic world by leaving substantial decision-making authority 
in the hands of commercial organisations, i.e. the actors “most familiar with the distinct characteristics and traits 
of (relevant) activities”.114 Modern business operations have already minimised the significance of territorial 
boundaries in a commercial sense. By relying on established internal networks and control devices, they 
also tend to be better equipped to grapple with the transnational character of slavery.115 Thus in the 
process of information gathering and synthesising, the relevant staff of a business, particularly those 
involved in supply chain management, are well positioned to prevent the behaviour in the first place.116 S. 
54 also seeks to tackle slavery and human trafficking indirectly, by giving investors, consumers and the 
public at large the ability to view businesses’ activities and react swiftly on the basis of accurate and 
comprehensive information to press for slavery-free products and supply chains.117 This can be done 
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wherever a commercial organisation has business and supply chains, even beyond its own nation-state’s 
geographical boundaries. 
With both self-reflexive and third-party dimensions, the potential of s. 54 goes beyond merely 
engendering the goodwill of businesses and discouraging infringement within their own undertakings; it 
may also induce commercial organisations to place proactive controlling measures on related third parties 
within its business proximity. The extensive economic and political powers of businesses with overseas 
supply chains make such extended monitoring feasible: before s. 54 was enacted, these economic giants 
already closely monitored their manufacturers to ensure that the supply chains ran efficiently.118 It is also 
found that when TNCs assess and address relevant risks, they are used to aggregating risks on an entire 
corporate group basis, rather than atomising the risks down to various constituent units.119 As such they 
are relatively well-positioned to enforce the respect of human rights in their business culture throughout 
their value chains.  
 
Promotion of Participatory Democracy  
 
Mandatory slavery disclosure is expected to serve as an important and viable means of deterring 
undesirable business conduct and increasing accountability, primarily by creating an oversight role over all 
affected communities and interested stakeholders. This reflects the fundamental tenet of reflexive law, 
which is predicated on making decision-making structures more sensitive to social forces, and designing 
institutional settings where affected groups can be guaranteed representation.120 Information required by s. 
54 is publicly available, 121  which potentially facilitates those traumatised by massive modern slavery 
violations to identify perpetrators, and draws on the expertise and capacity of wide stakeholders to 
respond to social ills. Pragmatically, the stimulating force of information disclosure and stakeholder 
engagement in improving business accountability has also been noted: when there are allegations of 
human right abuses, commercial organisations have been keen to settle matters privately in order to 
circumvent the possibility of obtaining an unfavourable judgment, which would be more publicised and 
likely generate adverse impacts on business reputation and financial health.122 
 
Flexibility in Business Decision-Making 
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In comparison with substantive laws which often struggle to find a balance between universality and 
industry-specific circumstances, and thus are more “likely to slip on the shoals of societal complexity”,123 s. 54 as 
a reflexive form of law does not mandate commercial organisations to achieve pre-determined anti-
slavery goals, or enable courts to remedy victims of transnational entities’ human rights abuses, but 
instead it allows for highly flexible forms of business decision-making. Such is the case with s. 54. By 
encouraging rather than directly obliging commercial organisations to combat modern slavery, reflexive 
law works as a basis for making cumulative step-by-step progress, without running counter to long-lasting 
business or human rights orthodoxies. Businesses also more readily see the value of engaging in this type 
of disclosure as the information supplied centres their proactive efforts to eradicate the crime, which 
would likely lead to less reparatory claims and more reputational-related benefits, including brand 
management considerations and consumer relations. 
 
Reflexive Law vs. Private Governance: The Creation of a Level Playing Field 
 
While reflexive law shares private governance initiatives’ reliance on invisible hand mechanisms, it seeks 
to do so in a regulated autonomous manner and to create a level playing field for all businesses, as s. 54 of 
the MSA sets out to do for “all businesses and corporations”.124 It is expected to eliminate the so-called 
prisoners’ dilemma and competitive disadvantages resulting from businesses’ expenditure related to direct 
compliance.  
The “prisoners’ dilemma” problem arises from the fact that in the absence of industry-wide knowledge, a 
firm may be inhibited about voluntarily disclosing information for fear of being compared with its rivals 
and possibly tainting the whole industry,125 a particular problem with social information disclosure under 
private governance mechanisms.126 A mandatory requirement eliminates such dilemmas by requiring all 
businesses over a certain size across all sectors to disclose. Furthermore, mandatory disclosure would help 
to eradicate the comparative disadvantages of ethical business pioneers. Even a cursory look at existing 
businesses’ social performance would find that the disclosure required by the MSA has already been 
practised by some big retailers and manufacturers: the majority of Fortune 100 companies involving 
global supply chains or production already have publicly available policies addressing human trafficking, 
and nearly two-thirds have publicly available policies on forced labour.127 But these disclosures are costly, 
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especially as regards information that is not directly related to profit-making. 128  By placing current 
voluntary disclosure practice within a regulatory framework, the government forces enterprises which 
have not yet taken action to do so, in the hope that businesses that are already taking action would not be 
unfairly disadvantaged for the relatively higher cost of labour and production caused by disclosure 
expenditure.  
The need just referred to to create a level playing field has had a significant shaping effect on the finalised 
details of s. 54. Initially, two proposals were put before Parliament: either to insert a new business 
disclosure clause into the Modern Slavery Bill, or to amend the existing strategic report requirement 
enshrined in the Companies Act 2006129 by asking for further details on modern slavery. The latter was 
rejected as the Companies Act 2006 primarily applies to UK companies and there was therefore a real 
danger that British businesses would end up being penalised.130 As explained by Andrew Wallis during the 
Parliamentary debate, the point of putting mandatory disclosure into the Modern Slavery Bill is “to make 
the playing field level as far and wide as possible”.131  Towards this end, s. 54 in its final form defines an 
extraterritorial reach by stipulating a territorially sufficient connection between the UK and the 
commercial organisation “which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom”. The 
disclosure duty prescribed in s. 54 thereby covers not only domestic commercial organisations, but also 
entities that have a global ambit of influence and only do part of their business in the UK.  
In comparison to legislation of the same kind – e.g. the California Act – the application scope of s. 54 is 
also notably wider. Qualifying commercial organisations under the California Act are restricted to those 
that are principally characterised by manufacturing or retail trade, and their relevant supply chains are 
limited to tangible goods supply only.132 In contrast, s. 54 applies to a far wider range of commercial 
organisations supplying either goods or services, with no restriction on the industrial sector.133 Not least 
owing to these improvements, the British Government is confident in its rhetoric of “establishing Britain as 
a world leader in the fight against modern slavery”,134 celebrating s. 54 as the “world-leading provision for transparency 
in supply chains”.135 
GREEN SHOOTS, BUT SPRING IS STILL FAR AWAY 
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Although reflexive lawmaking is principally commendable in many aspects, the normative and 
institutional challenges that this type of regulation encounters reveal that it is not yet fully ready to 
respond to social plurality. As discussed above, mainstream reflexive scholarship contends that formal 
aspects of law procedurally open up the decision-making process to a range of social deliberations, and 
create a far-reaching reliance on procedure as a means to strengthen the law’s sensitivity to societal 
changes. Nevertheless, the devil is in the details. It is difficult to frame the required formal and 
institutional architecture which would achieve the ends of “regulated self-regulation”, given the multi-layered 
forms of societal rationalities within which the law needs to be reflexive.136 As proved by Deakin and 
Rogowski’s study on EU labour standards, reflexive regulatory attempts have been operating in tension 
with wider state policy derogations.137  
Furthermore, reflexive scholarship intrinsically acknowledges the autopoietic nature of the social domains 
and the viability of consensual values emerging from processes of deliberation among autonomous 
institutions. However to a certain extent this replicates the weakness of private governance mechanisms 
in taking for granted the coherence between fragmented social forces and thus overlooking the risk of 
power asymmetries. As noted by Scheuerman, “it is often the biggest boys and girls who succeed in enforcing their 
interpretation on the other players.”138 Coupled with the inadequacies of formalised legal shells, opponents 
have plausibly suggested that reflexive law in this form represents little more than handing over the 
crucial lawmaking functions to some of the most privileged interests in society, just as private governance 
mechanisms have done.139 For instance, in his recent attempt to put reflexive law theory to a practical test 
in the corporate context, Harry Arthurs has voiced his doubts about the pragmatic effect of reflexive law, 
arguing that reflexive law often connects with neo-liberal economic policy-making.140 In the case of s. 54, 
these ingrained features of reflexive law impact not only on the doctrinal clarity but also on the pragmatic 
force of the provision, manifested by its ambiguous wording and the lack of compliance mechanisms.  
 
Concomitant Ambiguity  
 
By granting flexibility to businesses, there has to be a sacrifice in terms of the clarity of standards, and in 
consequence an inconsistency in implementation. Neither the MSA itself nor the subsequent guidance 
dictates the details of the information that commercial organisations have to disclose, leaving discretion to 
businesses to explain their policies and practices in ways suitable to their own business circumstances and 
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industry sectors. While this evidences legislators’ attempts to leverage between facilitating business 
efficiency and responding to concerns about a lack of business accountability for social costs, the open-
ended disclosure requirement in the MSA creates the potential for business reports that provide little to 
no information about slavery-connected conduct.141 Thus, in the case of s. 54, the balance between wider 
societal and business interests is likely to be tilted in favour of the latter. As stated by Andrew Wallis 
(CEO of Unseen UK) during the Parliamentary debate: “Fundamentally, (the requirement of slavery disclosure 
statement) should be viewed not as red tape but as a measure to protect British business.”142 Not least owing to this 
reason, the proposal in favour of slavery reporting has been enthusiastically backed up by business 
lobbying groups. Meanwhile, businesses’ incentive and performance in tackling modern slavery is unlikely 
to be significantly altered by a statutory requirement to disclose when they still have control of the 
content and extent of disclosure, rendering the symbolic significance of this legislative mode far in excess 
of its practical impact. 
The Act as it currently stands also suffers from several doctrinal ambiguities. For instance, one significant 
question that has to be asked in implementing s. 54 is how far down its supply chain a commercial 
organisation should be responsible for human rights protection disclosure. While s. 54 and its guidance 
assume the key term “supply chain” to be self-explanatory,143 it remains unclear whether the term entails all 
direct and indirect suppliers of products and services, or whether it is limited to those who have a direct 
relationship with the commercial organisation. It is also uncertain whether s. 54 incorporates all suppliers 
across lines of services or products, including those who are involved in the provision of component 
parts and unprocessed materials, or whether it merely refers to suppliers of the finished goods and 
services. Whether and to what extent the required information disclosure will be qualified by the business 
confidentiality principle, namely the availability of exemptions for business operations in countries with 
secrecy laws or prohibitions on disclosure,144 also remains unclear. After all, this is an area where national 
laws significantly contradict each other, and transnational enterprises would likely face dilemmas between 
complying with host government policies and adherence to home and international standards.145 
The prescribed threshold and extraterritorial reach of s. 54 based on the territorial rather than the 
business presence of a commercial organisation in the UK also provide certain loopholes for businesses 
to slip through the net of the MSA. As required by the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Transparency in Supply 
Chains) Regulations, every commercial organisation carrying on a business or part of a business in the 
UK with a total annual turnover of￡36 million needs to produce an annual slavery statement for the 
purpose of s.54.146 The threshold figure of ￡36 million was chosen as it conformed to the common 
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definition used in the Companies Act 2006 to define large-sized companies for other reporting 
requirements.147 While businesses at this level are more likely to have the resources and influence to effect 
necessary changes within their supply chains,148 this also means that small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs), which account for the vast majority of businesses in the UK, are exempted from the statutory 
disclosure.149  Given the additional fact that many businesses within the small to medium range are 
product suppliers and manufacturers, who are at the forefront of the anti-slavery battle, many have 
suggested the use of an opt-in scheme to facilitate SMEs’ official involvement into this transparency 
scheme.150 Regrettably, this suggestion was not taken into the final Regulation. It was also provided that 
the turnover of the franchiser and any franchisee within the UK will be individually counted for the 
purpose of s.54, leaving room for large businesses to alter their ways of operation and consequently 
escape from the obligation through the use of franchise or group company models.151 
As to the extraterritorial reach of s.54, neither the official Explanatory Notes to the Act the Practical 
Guide provides any specific guidance related to the meaning of “part of a business”.152 However, an analogy 
can be drawn with s.7 of the Bribery Act 2010, which uses the same wording as s. 54 of the MSA – “a 
commercial organisation … which carries on a business, or part of a business”. As specified by the Government’s 
official guidance, if a commercial organisation is not territorially connected to the UK but only has some 
sort of business connections, e.g. its securities are listed on the London Stock Exchange, it does not 
qualify as running a business or part of a business in the UK.153 On the basis of this territorial dominion 
principle,154 if a foreign enterprise merely sends a sales representative to the UK to solicit customers 
rather than to sign contracts on behalf of the entity, the enterprise would not be within the coverage of 
the Act. Likewise, a non-UK-based parent company could set up a subsidiary within the UK to conduct 
business. As long as the scale of the subsidiary does not exceed the prescribed turnover threshold of ￡36 
million, neither the parent nor the subsidiary company would be subject to the Act – submitting to the 
force of the Salomon principle.155 Getting a body corporate to assume responsibility for reporting on and 
combating modern slavery on behalf of the entire group touches on the fundamental tenets of modern 
corporate law, changes to which are unlikely to appear on any legislative agenda, at least in the near future. 
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Lack of Compliance Mechanisms and the Doubtful Force of Invisible Hand Discipline 
 
Placing the disclosure requirement within the framework of the MSA comes at a price as regards effective 
enforcement. With regard to non-compliance, s. 54 allows the Secretary of State to seek an injunction or 
order of specific performance to enforce the obligation. There is also the possibility of a judicial review 
challenge to the decision of the Secretary of State not to seek an order of disclosure. The hope is that the 
threat of an injunction issued by the courts would endanger the reputation of a commercial organisation 
and therefore might constitute an incentive for complying with the MSA. 156  However, without the 
standardisation procedures required of financial reports, s. 54 falls short of providing a means for 
appraising and punishing poor-quality or incomplete information disclosure. In fact, a commercial 
organisation will be regarded as having properly disclosed by simply stating that it has taken no relevant 
action during the financial year.157 Strategically selected disclosure is thus expected from businesses who 
have performed unsatisfactorily in human rights protection – in the event that business activities have 
caused physical and mental damage, such information is unlikely to appear in the required report, 
hindering the public’s access to truth. 
Another profound weakness of s. 54 is the absence of an information verification mechanism. S. 54 as it 
currently stands does not require commercial organisations to disclose whether the information has been 
verified by independent third parties. Challenges of assessing compliance are therefore magnified: the fact 
that information is gathered across jurisdictions makes it virtually impossible for the general public to 
check on the authenticity of such disclosure, since they lack the professional knowledge, skills, resources 
and time. In addition, unlike financial-related information, there is, incredibly, no offence of providing 
false information about slavery policies.158 In the absence of “mechanisms to investigate, punish, and redress 
abuses”,159 eliminating slavery in the supply chain context ultimately depends on business-based initiatives, 
which encourages unprincipled entities to merely “burnish their image without changing their behaviour”.160 
This difficulty of enforcement has already been pragmatically proved during the enforcement of the 
California Transparency Act, the California state equivalent to the MSA. Without accompanying 
verification and standardisation mechanisms, commercial organisations have been at liberty to interpret 
the reporting requirements “however they see fit”,161 and in practice they have responded in widely divergent 
ways: some have provided detailed policies and measures to avoid using enslaved and trafficked 
individuals, but many merely repeated the statutory language without providing any details of their 
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operation, and quite a few interpreted the law in a literal manner, and merely reported that they did not 
undertake any of the measures set out by the law.162 
It would be wrong to conclude that the lack of compliance mechanisms was because of the UK 
legislators’ neglect of the issue. As a matter of fact, the issue of enforcement was extensively discussed at 
the Parliamentary debate stage. For instance, on 4 November 2014 Diana Johnson suggested placing a 
mandatory disclosure requirement into the Companies Act framework, since a range of personal and 
corporate enforcement procedures were already in place there.163 In comparison, the suggested MSA 
enforcement procedures via civil injunctions would be costly and time-consuming, and therefore unlikely 
to bring about substantive progress in the anti-slavery battle, other than from “those who would in any case 
seek to comply (with the anti-slavery agenda) on a voluntary basis”.164 After deciding to put the disclosure provision 
in the MSA context, it was further proposed by various parties that the provision needed to “be backed up 
with some teeth”,165 for instance, by extending the role of the independent anti-slavery commissioner to 
monitor compliance with the provision,166 having businesses slavery statements externally audited,167 and 
introducing a clear enforcement mechanism.168 To be fair, although the suggested measures would not 
completely eliminate the power asymmetries endemic to reflexive law in its current conceptual form, at 
least they would help in terms of businesses’ effective enforcement of the disclosure obligation, by 
allowing comparability, punishing non-compliance and ensuring the trustworthiness of the reports. 
However, none of the suggestions above were included in the final form of s. 54, owing to concerns 
about overburdening businesses.  
 
To take the point further, whether the “invisible hand” discipline would necessarily work as anticipated by 
the legislators also remains doubtful. This mechanism relies on swift market and societal reactions to 
business disclosure, for instance the fluctuation of share prices and hostile takeovers, and oversight and 
actions exerted by financial market authorities and/or affected stakeholders, such as threats of litigation 
and boycotts.169 However, few can overlook disparities in the effectiveness of markets caused by their 
highly diversified structures and magnitudes,170 as well as inextricable links to the social and economic 
environments as a whole.171 A careful empirical scrutiny of market and societal practices also casts doubt 
on the swiftness and accuracy of market reaction to social values.172 Taking account of the additional fact 
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that under s. 54 commercial organisations can control the content of disclosure and even get away with a 
simple statement that no action has been taken, it is less likely that this mandated disclosure would make 
significant progress in enhancing stakeholder engagement and eliminating modern slavery along supply 
chains, in comparison with non-mandatory initiatives. The cognitive openness of reflexive law in its 
current conceptual frame, added to its over-optimistic faith in the processes of deliberation in prompting 
social consensus, thereby largely replicates the weakness of private governance in assuming coherence 
between fragmented social forces, generating similar pragmatic risks of power asymmetries between 
multi-stakeholder groups and implementation inconsistencies. This also reflects Teubner’s initial concern 
about reflexive law – a weakness that this capacious yet imprecise regulatory proposition has to overcome, 
as he pointed out in 1984, is to find out what kinds of formalised procedures the law needs to develop in 
order to steer the differentiated social sub-systems. 173  Thirty years on, it seems that not much has 
improved in this regard.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Increasing business practices across national boundaries, exemplified by the expanding reach and role of 
multinational enterprises, have been generating novel governance issues, business-related human rights 
abuses being a significant example. Evidence points to the occurrence of modern slavery through 
transnational businesses’ own activities and supply chain relationships, and even alleges the complicity of 
these economic giants, aiding and abetting in their global pursuit of economic objectives.174 
 
Admittedly, conventional regulatory methods are not fully prepared for the business and human rights 
issues generated by the surge of globalisation, particularly with regard to the egregious human rights abuse 
of modern slavery. As shown in Part II, existing regulatory frameworks have fallen short of effectively 
implementing the moral vision in this regard. Self-regulation and other private governance initiatives have 
proved inadequate in practice, limited by the overwhelmingly profit-oriented vision of businesses, the 
asymmetric power relations between social institutions, and the absence of effective grievance 
mechanisms. In the meantime, the option of imposing substantive obligations on transnational 
commercial organisations stands at odds with existing legal frameworks in two major aspects: first, the 
application of international human rights law to non-state private actors; and second, the extraterritorial 
adjudication of activities occurring outside the adjudicating state. In addition, the issue of business and 
human rights is closely entangled with the political climate, further adding to the challenge of protecting 
human rights against business-related harm. 
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As part of the unprecedented international push to eliminate modern slavery, the UK inaugurated the 
Modern Slavery Act in early 2015, with s. 54 requiring more transparency in businesses’ supply chains. 
This lawmaking attempt can best be understood in reflexive terms, demonstrated by its encouragement of 
internal business policy-making, its stimulation of affected parties’ participation, and its reflections on 
legal developments in the external context, most notably, those in the US and the EU. As one way of 
eliminating multinationals’ adverse human rights impacts, this type of reflexive lawmaking is claimed to 
have many advantages over conventional regulatory models. Unlike the command-and-control option, s. 
54 does not provoke strident opposition from businesses. While disclosure does not directly impose 
human rights protection duties on commercial organisations, it does encourage them to respond in a 
timely and effective manner to public concerns and the constantly altering societal reality. By raising 
consumers’ and wider society’s awareness of combating modern slavery, a new set of expectations based 
on accountability and transparency may also be created for businesses, thereby generating instrumental 
impacts on businesses’ sales and other measures of performance. Given its improvement over existing 
business disclosure requirements, human rights advocates also see it as an important step forward for 
more responsible business performance. As commented by Reilkoff, “transparency alone is not sufficient to 
achieve positive social ends, but it is necessary”.175 
While the inauguration of s.54 indicates a commendable attempt to build state-led regulatory systems 
embracing the collective efforts of civil society, the high hopes invested in reflexive law in general, and 
the harmonisation of conflicting interests and disagreement between business and non-business groups 
affected by the regulated activity by procedural norms in particular, have not been fully borne out by this 
lawmaking experience. To begin with, one should not overlook the absence of verification and discipline 
mechanisms in preventing and regulating deceitful or incomplete disclosure within the current disclosure 
framework. Although various parties, including legislators, international organisations and the general 
public, are assumed to be tasked with using the disclosed information to press for further change, the 
pragmatic effect is likely to be limited. More challenging still, there exists the regulatory inclination 
towards privileged economic interests. The cognitive openness of reflexive law accords well with the 
dynamic character of globalised society and economic activities; alas, it also increases the probability of a 
discretionary regulatory system tailored to the interests of those in possession of the greatest de facto social 
and economic power. In the case of s. 54, the legislators gave complete autonomy to commercial 
organisations to determine what to disclose in “better reflecting the needs of their particular operation”,176 resulting 
in the current equivocal provenance of the provision and doctrinal ambiguities in its details. As the 
Californian experience has shown, significant disparity among businesses’ disclosure is likely to be 
generated by the considerable extent of autonomy granted to regulated entities. 
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Furthermore, transparency alone cannot bring better justice. Even under s.54’s statutory attempt to 
disclose aspects of commercial organisations’ supply chain operations, the nature, substantive content and 
scope of commercial organisations’ responsibilities to respect human rights and eliminate slavery practices 
in their supply chains are still up to individual organisations’ discretionary interpretation, and thus remain 
controversial, as with present-day private governance practices.177 Short of both the descriptive accuracy 
and the prescriptive power, the reflexive lawmaking attempt of s. 54 seems more practically reminiscent 
of existing forms of private governance than proponents’ idealised “socially sensitive, public-minded” solution 
to the social ill of modern slavery.178 While it would be premature to swiftly rule out the significance of 
this regulatory strategy in the evolutionary development of law and its positive impact in raising awareness 
of fighting modern slavery in global supply chains, intellectual and practical challenges remain for the 
current school of process-oriented reflexive law, if it is to emerge as “the dominant form of post-modern law” as 
hoped.179 
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